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Why Are Consumers Less Loss Averse in Internal than External Reference Prices? 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The literature has produced mixed support for loss aversion in a reference price context 
and the outcome may depend on the type of reference price. One extant study has 
reported empirical evidence that consumers are less loss averse in internal than external 
reference prices, but without discussing causes or implications. In the current study, we 
reconcile relevant literature and propose this asymmetric loss aversion result as an 
empirical generalization. Next, we provide and test an explanation: two empirical 
regularities in pricing cause that consumers tend to observe few losses for external 
reference price and many losses for internal reference price, making them less sensitive to 
internal than external losses. We use two scanner panel data sets to show that the two 
empirical regularities contribute to asymmetric loss aversion, while accounting for 
alternative explanations. We explore the implications of loss aversion asymmetry for the 
effectiveness of price promotions by simulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A large body of literature has considered the impact of reference prices on brand 
choice, resulting in the empirical generalization that consumers do not merely judge the 
absolute price, but evaluate it against reference points (Winer 1986; Blattberg et al. 1995; 
Kalyanaram and Winer 1995; Meyer and Johnson 1995). They construct an external 
reference price (ERP) from current shelf prices in the product category1 and an internal 
reference price (IRP) for each brand based on recalled previous prices. Though price 
recall studies indicate that consumers have limited price memory (Dickson and Sawyer 
1990; Vanhuele and Dreze 2002), both reference price types drive brand choice and have 
been incorporated into brand choice models simultaneously (Kumar et al. 1998; Mayhew 
and Winer 1992; Rajendran and Tellis 1994; Mazumdar and Papatla 2000). 
 Consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and mental 
accounting (Thaler 1985), a second empirical generalization is that consumers are loss 
averse: they react more strongly to prices above the reference price (i.e., losses) than to 
prices below (i.e., gains) (Kalyanaram and Winer 1995). However, while there is strong 
consensus on reference prices influencing brand choice, the existence of loss aversion in 
a reference price context is debated (Bell and Lattin 2000; Mazumdar et al. 2005) and 
studies have found opposite results (Briesch et al. 1997; Krishnamurthi et al. 1992).  
The presence of loss aversion could depend on whether the reference price is 
external or internal: Mazumdar and Papatla (2000, p. 254) conclude from a thorough 
empirical analysis on four product categories that “ERP segments are found to be more 
loss averse than the IRP ones”, but without providing discussion. It is unclear what the 
                                                   
1 We focus on ERP that is the current price of a reference brand (Hardie et al. 1993). The literature also 
contains other forms such as the retailer-supplied comparative price (Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin 2003).   
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implications are for pricing strategies and also to what extent this loss aversion 
asymmetry between ERP and IRP is a universal phenomenon. Moreover, from a 
theoretical perspective, the mechanisms triggering the asymmetry remain not well-
understood. While the literature has identified household-level characteristics influencing 
loss aversion, these have only been tested for IRP (Erdem et al. 2001; Krishnamurthi et 
al. 1992) or found to work in the same direction for ERP and IRP (Klapper et al. 2005); 
they have not been connected to loss aversion asymmetry.  
The current paper addresses these issues. It establishes Mazumdar and Papatla’s 
loss aversion asymmetry as an empirical generalization (Bass and Wind 1995) and 
explains the asymmetry by two empirical regularities in pricing: (1) brands with larger 
choice shares tend to be more expensive, and (2) brand prices tend to increase over time. 
The mechanism we propose and test is that these regularities trigger ERP gains and IRP 
losses, respectively, and that the larger number of IRP losses than ERP losses makes 
consumers relatively less sensitive to the former type. We find empirical support from 
two scanner panel data sets that the two regularities drive loss aversion asymmetry, while 
controlling for several alternative explanations. We further contribute to the literature by 
exploring the implications of loss aversion asymmetry for the long-run (cumulative) 
impact of price promotions through simulation. 
In this article, we start by defining loss aversion asymmetry in a utility framework 
and reconcile empirical evidence from the literature to come up with our empirical 
generalization. Next, we lay out the rationale for consumers usually being less loss averse 
in IRP than ERP, and we discuss the role of the two empirical regularities in detail; two 
scanner panel data sets show the connection between the regularities and loss aversion 
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asymmetry. Finally, we conduct the simulation experiment to present managerial 
implications. 
 
LOSS AVERSION ASYMMETRY 
 
We focus on the role of reference prices in brand choice and add non-price factors in 
a later stage. In so doing, we define utility resulting from brand j as 
 
(1)             𝑈𝑗 = 𝛽𝐸�ERPGAIN𝑗 + 𝜆ERPLOSS𝑗� + 𝛽𝐼�IRPGAIN𝑗 + 𝜆𝜇IRPLOSS𝑗�, 
 
where ERPGAIN𝑗 is the difference between the external reference price and the observed 
price of brand j when the reference price is above the observed price, ERPLOSS𝑗 is this 
difference when the reference price is below the observed price, and IRPGAIN𝑗 and IRPLOSS𝑗 are defined similarly for the internal reference price. The coefficients 𝛽𝐸 and 
𝛽𝐼 capture the effects of ERP gains and IRP gains, respectively, and 𝜆 is the loss aversion 
parameter for ERP (Bell and Lattin 2000; Hardie et al. 1993): 𝜆 > 1 indicates loss 
aversion, i.e., higher responsiveness to losses than to equal-sized gains. As loss aversion 
in IRP is defined by 𝜆𝜇, parameter 𝜇 is the ratio of loss aversion in IRP relative to ERP: 
consumers are less loss averse in IRP than ERP when 𝜇 < 1. We expect all four 
coefficients 𝛽𝐸, 𝛽𝐼, 𝜆 and 𝜇 to be positive, as all gain and loss variables in (1) are framed 
as the reference price minus the observed price (Bell and Lattin 2000; Hardie et al. 1993). 
Equation (1) does not have a separate price term, as it is not jointly identified with the 
ERP gain-loss components (Briesch et al. 1997; Moon et al. 2006; Niedrich et al. 2009).2  
                                                   
2 Neither ERP nor the response coefficients in (1) are brand-specific, causing that price drops out when the 
ERP gain and loss terms are included. 
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< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 To investigate the hypothesis 𝜇 < 1, as suggested by Mazumdar and Papatla 
(2000), we compute 𝜇 from other empirical studies that report loss aversion coefficients 
for both ERP and IRP; these extant studies do not provide 𝜇 directly. Table 1 summarizes 
the results. Bell and Lattin (2000) report significant loss aversion in ERP, i.e. 𝜆 > 1, for 7 
out of 12 product categories (without showing the actual coefficients) and no evidence of 
asymmetric price response for IRP in any category (𝜆𝜇 = 1), consistent with consumers 
being less loss averse in IRP (𝜇 < 1). Briesch et al. (1997) show parameter estimates for 
ERP and IRP in the liquid detergent category. Their estimates amount to 𝜇 = .47. Both 
Bell and Lattin (2000) and Briesch et al. (1997) have accounted for unobserved 
heterogeneity via latent classes. Hardie et al. (1993) do not consider unobserved 
heterogeneity in response to marketing mix; their estimated loss aversion coefficients for 
ERP and IRP in the orange juice category are 𝜆 = 1.66 and 𝜆𝜇 = 1.46, implying that 
𝜇 = .88. Mazumdar and Papatla (1995) consider two product categories and distinguish 
between two deterministic segments driven by ERP and IRP, respectively; their 
parameter estimates in the margarine category are consistent with 𝜇 < 1, but the numbers 
for liquid detergent run counter to the results of Briesch et al. (1997) for the same 
category and our expectations. Moon et al. (2006) employ a latent class structural 
heterogeneity model of reference price usage; they find evidence of loss aversion in the 
toilet tissue category for both ERP and IRP, but much stronger for the former reference 
price type (𝜇 = .27). Finally, Pauwels et al. (2007) use aggregate brand sales data for 
twenty product categories and find “increased price sensitivity for gains, but decreased 
price sensitivity for losses” regarding IRP, but no significant differences for ERP; their 
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parameter estimates imply that 𝜇 = .65. We conclude from these studies from different 
authors in different settings that loss aversion asymmetry between ERP and IRP is 
commonplace and propose it as an empirical generalization. 
 
RATIONALE FOR LOSS AVERSION AYMMETRY 
 
The mechanism connecting the two empirical regularities in pricing to loss aversion 
asymmetry is that these regularities lead to less ERP losses and more IRP losses, making 
consumers relatively less sensitive to the latter. The notion that high-frequency events 
receive less weight has roots in social psychology (Nisbett and Ross 1980). In making 
probability judgments, chances of high-frequency events are underestimated, while low-
frequency events are overestimated (Kahneman et al. 1982). Similarly, respondents 
underreport high-frequency events and over-report low-frequency events in recall-based 
tasks, as low-frequency events are more salient (Schroder et al. 2003). Analogous 
findings exist for non-recall based tasks (Fiske 1980; Kanouse and Hanson 1972). 
 The two empirical regularities (or conditions3) are (1) brands with larger choice 
shares tend to be more expensive, and (2) brand prices tend to increase over time; they 
appear at the product category (or market) level, but can also be defined at the level of the 
individual consumer (or household) that can be viewed as a market segment of size one. 
As the theoretical link with loss aversion asymmetry is made at the consumer rather than 
category level, an individual level analysis is the most natural way to go. For testing 
purposes, an advantage of the disaggregate approach is that it offers ample variation in 
the outcomes of the two conditions. While the empirical regularities typically hold at the 
                                                   
3 We use the terms empirical regularity and condition interchangeably, though an empirical regularity is 
observed at the category level and the corresponding condition can also be measured at the individual level. 
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category level (offering little variation unless many categories are considered), there is 
substantial variation across individual purchase occasions. For instance, chosen brands 
vary and as a result choice shares of expensive versus cheap brands vary as well 
(variation in Condition 1). Similarly, consumers observe different price sequences 
(variation in Condition 2), as brand prices vary over time and purchasing patterns differ 
in terms of average cycle, degree of regularity and when the bulk of the purchases was 
made.4 Below we argue that the two empirical regularities trigger more ERP gains and 
IRP losses, respectively, making losses more frequent for IRP than ERP (reducing loss 
aversion in IRP relative to ERP via the frequency-importance mechanism described 
earlier). 
 
Condition 1: brands with larger choice shares are more expensive  
Most scanner panel data used in published studies originate from the eighties and 
nineties. Consistent with Condition 1, these data often contain a positive correlation 
between brand price and choice share (Bolton 1989; Klapper et al. 2005). The majority of 
reference price studies have operationalized ERP as the current shelf price of the 
previously chosen brand (Bell and Lattin 2000; Briesch et al. 1997; Hardie et al. 1993; 
Kopalle et al. 1996; Moon et al. 2006), meaning that at many purchase occasions ERP is 
the price of a brand with a large choice share. As according to Condition 1 large-share 
brands tend to have higher prices, there are many high ERPs and hence many gains 
relative to these high ERPs. 
The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates the principle for a consumer with a 
purchasing pattern that is consistent with the empirical regularity: the expensive brand 
                                                   
4 In line with extant panel data studies of brand choice, an implicit assumption is that households only 
observe brand prices at purchase occasions and not at other shopping trips (Chang et al.1999). 
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has a choice share of 80%, i.e., it has been the previous choice at 4 out of 5 purchase 
occasions, while the cheap brand has been picked only once. As the expensive brand is 
more often the previously chosen brand and therefore tends to be the reference brand (the 
exception is occasion 3), the consumer indeed experiences more ERP gains than losses. 
For expository purposes, the illustration focuses on one “cheap” brand and one 
“expensive” brand, with prices fixed over time, so that price level and price ranking 
coincide at every occasion. In an extended scenario with price variation due to price 
shifts and promotional offers, the mechanism remains valid. However, brands that are 
more expensive on average no longer need to be more expensive at every occasion. As 
the frequency of ERP gains is determined by each occasion’s price ranking of the 
previously chosen brand, we measure the extent to which Condition 1 is met by the 
average price ranking of chosen brands across purchase occasions.5 
 
< FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
In a different context, Bell and Lattin (2000) have also employed the mechanism 
that consumers purchasing more expensive brands face more gains relative to ERP.  
These authors use it to point out that not properly accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity results in a price response curve with spurious loss aversion; less price 
sensitive consumers (flatter price response and buying more expensive brands) tend to be 
concentrated in the gains part of the price response curve, while price sensitive 
consumers (steeper price response and cheaper brands) are located in the losses part; this 
could falsely suggest the presence of loss aversion when individual consumers are not 
                                                   
5 This definition of expensiveness is most strongly connected to ERP gains and losses. We verified that the 
empirical findings are robust to replacing the price rankings by price levels in dollar cents.  
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loss averse. Their seminal work emphasizes a measurement issue regarding loss aversion, 
while we focus on a behavioral explanation of loss aversion asymmetry between ERP and 
IRP. Nevertheless, the findings of Bell and Lattin imply that ignored unobserved 
heterogeneity could be an alternative explanation for loss aversion asymmetry, as it 
would cause overestimation of loss aversion in ERP. We rule out this alternative 
explanation by incorporating unobserved heterogeneity into our empirical analysis. 
 
Condition 2: brand prices increase over time 
It is well-established that prices show upward trends due to inflation. As (a) this 
implies that past prices tend to be lower than the current price and (b) IRP is based on 
these lower past prices, consumers experience many losses when comparing current 
prices to IRPs. The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates this mechanism for a consumer 
observing a price pattern that is consistent with the empirical regularity. For expository 
purposes, we define IRP as the brand’s previous price, a special case of the more general 
IRP employed in the empirical analysis. Indeed, the current price is higher than the 
previous price (which serves as the IRP), causing perceived losses.  
In the illustration, IRP is determined by the brand’s price at the previous occasion, 
implying that the number of IRP losses coincides with the number of occasions that the 
price has increased: it is the frequency that matters. However, extant reference price 
studies indicate that IRP is shaped by a substantially larger number of past purchase 
occasions (Briesch et al. 1997; Niedrich et al. 2009). Under these more realistic 
circumstances, the gap between the brand’s price and its IRP is not only the result of the 
frequency of price increases versus decreases but is the net effect of both the frequency 
9 
 
and magnitude. We therefore measure the extent to which Condition 2 is met by the 
average price change between all subsequent purchase occasions across all brands.  
 
FORMAL LINK BETWEEN CONDITIONS AND LOSS AVERSION 
 
To formally connect the two pricing conditions to loss aversion in ERP (i.e., 𝜆) 
and loss aversion in IRP (i.e., 𝜆𝜇), we consider a situation with a high outcome (H) and a 
situation with a low outcome (L) for each of these conditions. We define COND1(H) >COND1(L) for Condition 1, with the values of COND1(H) and COND1(L) being average 
price rankings of chosen brands. Similarly, COND2(H) > COND2(L) for Condition 2, 
where the values of COND2(H) and COND2(L) correspond to average price change 
between subsequent purchase occasions. 
As Condition 1 affects the number of ERP gains but is not related to the number 
of IRP gains, it may influence loss aversion 𝜆 in ERP, even though 𝜆𝜇 for IRP remains 
constant. If we define 
 
(2)                                                               𝜆(H) = (1/𝜃1) 𝜆(L),  
 
for some 𝜃1 > 0, then 𝜆(H)𝜇(H) =  𝜆(L)𝜇(L) (i.e., constant 𝜆𝜇) yields 
 
(3)                                                                   𝜇(H) = 𝜃1 𝜇(L). 
 
As Condition 1 should lead to more ERP gains, i.e., less losses, and we expect that 
consumers become more loss averse if losses are less frequent, we hypothesize that  𝜆(H) >  𝜆(L); this corresponds to the hypothesis 𝜃1 < 1 in (2) and (3). 
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 We follow a similar logic for Condition 2. It affects the number of IRP losses but 
is not related to the number of ERP losses. Hence, while 𝜆 remains constant for ERP, loss 
aversion 𝜆𝜇 for IRP may change via the loss aversion asymmetry parameter 𝜇; we define 
 
(4)                                                                𝜇(H) = 𝜃2 𝜇(L) 
 
for some 𝜃2 > 0. As Condition 2 should lead to more IRP losses and we expect less loss 
aversion if the frequency of losses increases, we hypothesize that 𝜇(H) < 𝜇(L), amounting 
to  𝜃2 < 1 in (4). 
 Above, we have described the mathematical link between the two pricing 
conditions and loss aversion asymmetry by comparing a “high” with a “low” outcome. 
Empirically, however, such an approach with one parameter in one pairwise comparison 
would not leave any degrees of freedom. We therefore put (2), (3) and (4) with associated 
hypotheses 𝜃1 < 1 and 𝜃2 < 1 in a format that allows us to simultaneously consider the 
entire range of outcomes of COND1 and COND2. In so doing, we redefine the 
homogeneous loss aversion parameter 𝜆 in (1) as  
 
(5)                                                          𝜆 ≡ 𝜆 exp(−𝛿1COND1) 
 
and we redefine the homogeneous asymmetry parameter 𝜇 in (1) as 
 
(6)                                             𝜇 ≡ 𝜇 exp(𝛿1COND1) exp(𝛿2COND2). 
 
Our hypothesis 𝜃1 < 1 in (2) and (3) maps one-to-one into 𝛿1 < 0 in (5) and (6), while 
𝜃2 < 1 in (4) coincides with 𝛿2 < 0 in (6). We can verify this easily: if COND1(H) >
11 
 
COND1(L), 𝜆(H) ≡ 𝜆 exp(−𝛿1COND1(H)) in (5) and 𝜆(L) ≡ 𝜆 exp(−𝛿1COND1(L)) in (5), 
then 𝛿1 < 0 implies that 𝜆(H) > 𝜆(L), which is (2) with 𝜃1 < 1. Similarly, if 𝜇(H) ≡
𝜇 exp(𝛿1COND1(H)) exp(𝛿2COND2) and 𝜇(L) is defined analogously in (6), then 𝛿1 < 0 
leads to 𝜇(H) < 𝜇(L) while still satisfying 𝜆(H)𝜇(H) = 𝜆(L)𝜇(L); this is (3) with 𝜃1 < 1. 
Analogously, there is a one-to-one correspondence between (6) with 𝛿2 < 0 and (4) with 
𝜃2 < 1. In sum, we have two hypotheses about the empirical regularities triggering loss 
aversion asymmetry; one hypothesis connects the first condition to more loss aversion in 
ERP, while the other connects the second condition to less loss aversion in IRP. 
  
Hypothesis for Condition 1: the higher the average price ranking of chosen brands, the 
more loss aversion there will be in ERP, i.e., 𝛿1 < 0.  
 
Hypothesis for Condition 2: the higher the average price change between subsequent 
purchase occasions, the less loss aversion there will be in IRP, i.e., 𝛿2 < 0. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
We use two A.C. Nielsen scanner panel data sets of brand choice and marketing mix 
in the ketchup and peanut butter categories in the Sioux Falls SD market. The data run 
from June 1986 to October 1988 and cover 124 weeks. We consider households with at 
least 10 purchases in the category: 732 households who together made 12,681 purchases 
in the ketchup category and 1047 households whose number of purchases totaled 19,664 
for peanut butter. The analysis includes the ketchup brands Heinz, Hunts, Del Monte and 
Store brand and the peanut butter brands Jif, Peter Pan, Skippy and Store brand (Erdem et 
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al. 2001). Each household’s first five purchases serve as an initialization period to “warm 
up” the internal reference prices and a brand loyalty variable. 
 
< TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
Frequencies of gains and losses 
Table 2 reports the percentages of gains and losses that households experienced in 
brand prices across all purchase occasions in the calibration period and all brands6. As 
anticipated, there are more gains (and fewer losses) for ERP than IRP in both product 
categories. For ketchup, the percentage of ERP gains is 68 and the percentage of IRP 
gains is 50, implying a differential of 18 points. Similarly, the percentages are 54 and 30 
for peanut butter, a differential of 24 points. Chi-square tests show that the frequency 
differentials between ERP and IRP are significant in both categories (p < .0001). We 
further note that for both ERP and IRP the percentage of gains is larger for ketchup than 
for peanut butter. This is consistent with the two pricing conditions: (1) Heinz is the 
undisputed market leader in the ketchup category and by far the most expensive brand, 
while this positive share-expensiveness relationship is less pronounced for peanut butter 
(Condition 1; more ERP gains for ketchup); (2) the prices of all brands have increased 
over time in the peanut butter category, but some ketchup brands have become cheaper 
(Condition 2; more IRP gains for ketchup). 
 
 
 
                                                   
6 To compute the number of IRP losses, we use the estimated IRP carry-over parameter in our base model. 
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Base model of brand choice and presence of loss aversion asymmetry 
 To verify that our data sets contain loss aversion asymmetry and are in line with 
the extant studies in Table 1, we first estimate 𝜇 from a base model of brand choice that is 
similar to what has been done in the literature; we allow for loss aversion in both ERP 
and IRP but do not yet try to explain these loss aversion estimates. In so doing, we extend 
utility specification (1) by accounting for the household’s previous brand choices (i.e., 
brand-specific loyalty), the brand’s feature advertising and display activities as well as 
unobserved heterogeneity. As explained earlier, in particular the last addition is 
important: heterogeneity not accounted for may result in spurious loss aversion (Bell and 
Lattin 2000) and may bias the estimated loss aversion asymmetry. We capture 
unobserved heterogeneity by allowing for latent classes and determining the optimal 
number of segments by the Bayes Information criterion (BIC). This criterion results in 
three segments for ketchup and four segments for peanut butter. Furthermore, consistent 
with the approach and findings of Bell and Lattin (2000), the BIC values indicate that a 
parsimonious model with segment-independent loss aversion parameter 𝜆 and asymmetry 
parameter 𝜇 is appropriate.7 The level of deterministic utility for household i (in segment 
s) choosing brand j on purchase occasion t is 
 
(7)  𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑡|𝑠 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽1,𝑠BLOY𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑠FEATURE𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑠DISPLAY𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
                 + 𝛽𝐸,𝑠�ERPGAIN𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜆ERPLOSS𝑖,𝑗,𝑡� + 𝛽𝐼,𝑠�IRPGAIN𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜆𝜇IRPLOSS𝑖,𝑗,𝑡�, 
 
                                                   
7 We do keep the price responsiveness coefficients 𝛽𝐸 and 𝛽𝐼 heterogeneous in order to avoid bias from 
ignored heterogeneity in price sensitivity (Klapper et al. 2005). Substantive results are preserved if λ and µ 
would be heterogeneous too. 
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where BLOY𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜅BLOYBLOY𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜅BLOY)𝐼(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑗) is the brand-specific 
loyalty measure of Guadagni and Little (1983), with smoothing parameter 0 ≤ 𝜅BLOY ≤1 and 𝐼(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑗) being a 0/1 dummy variable indicating whether household i chose 
brand j at the previous purchase occasion 𝑡 − 1. Similar to choice shares, ∑ BLOY𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =𝑗1, i.e., brand loyalty scores sum to one across brands. For initialization, BLOY𝑖,𝑗,1 =
𝜅BLOY if brand j was chosen, while it is (1 − 𝜅BLOY)/(# brands − 1) otherwise 
(Guadagni and Little 1983). We translate the utilities in (7) to logit brand choice 
probabilities by computing 
 (8)                                               𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡|𝑠 = exp(𝑈𝑖,𝑗,𝑡|𝑠)∑ exp(𝑈𝑖,𝑘,𝑡|𝑠)𝑘   
 
and obtain all parameter estimates by numerically maximizing the log-likelihood 
 
(9)                               ln 𝐿 = � ln��𝜋𝑠
𝑠
� �𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡|𝑠𝐼(𝑦𝑖,𝑡=𝑗)
𝑗𝑡
�� ,
𝑖
 
 
where 𝜋𝑠 is the relative size of segment s and 𝐼(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑗) is a 0/1 dummy variable 
indicating whether household i chose brand j at occasion t. 
Consistent with most extant studies, we operationalize ERP in (7) as the current 
shelf price of the previously chosen brand; this ERP is household-specific but common 
for all brands, is behaviorally plausible and has been shown to perform well empirically 
(Hardie et al. 1993). We verified that it fits our scanner panel data better than other ERP 
operationalizations such as the current average shelf price across brands, the highest shelf 
price or the lowest price (Kumar et al. 1998; Rajendran and Tellis 1994) as well as a 
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loyalty-weighted ERP (Mazumdar and Papatla 1995; 2000). We define IRP as an 
exponentially smoothed average of the brand’s past prices, i.e., IRP𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜅IRPIRP𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +(1 − 𝜅IRP)PRICE𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1, with the smoothing parameter 0 ≤ 𝜅IRP ≤ 1  reflecting the 
amount of price memory (Kalyanaram and Little 1994; Niedrich et al. 2009). This brand-
specific IRP performed best in an extensive comparison of alternative reference price 
specifications (Briesch et al. 1997) and is most frequently used in the literature (Erdem et 
al. 2001). Consistent with the findings of Briesch et al. (1997) and Rajendran and Tellis 
(1994), the brand-specific IRP fits our data substantially better than an IRP based on 
prices paid for previously chosen brands. Our estimates of 𝜇 in (7) are . 39 for ketchup 
and . 48 for peanut butter; both are significantly smaller than 1, which is in line with the 
extant studies in Table 1 and provides further evidence of loss aversion asymmetry. 
 
Full model of brand choice with asymmetry and pricing conditions 
We build the full model of brand choice by incorporating the two pricing 
conditions COND1𝑖,𝑡 and COND2𝑖,𝑡 into the base model via (5) and (6). Furthermore, we 
extend (6) with other variables that may affect loss aversion asymmetry in 𝜇 and serve as 
alternative explanations; we add these variables in the same way as COND1𝑖,𝑡 and COND2𝑖,𝑡 and mean-center the variables in (5) and (6). As control variables in (6), we 
consider two measures of purchase behavior (the household’s brand loyalty and average 
interpurchase time until occasion t) and two socio-demographic characteristics 
(household size and income). Findings by Klapper et al. (2005) and Krishnamurthi et al. 
(1992) indicate that loss aversion becomes stronger for households with stronger brand 
loyalty, reflected by a larger Herfindahl index  ∑ BLOY𝑖,𝑗,𝑡2𝑗 ; an explanation is that loyal 
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customers are relatively insensitive to price discounts (gains) but may switch if they 
encounter a bad price (loss) for their preferred brand. Klapper et al. also report evidence 
that longer interpurchase times are associated with more loss aversion, but note that 
causality may be in the opposite direction: highly loss averse households may postpone 
category purchases more often until they encounter acceptable prices. We include 
household size and income as socio-demographic variables, as financially constrained 
households may be more loss sensitive with regard to IRP (Erdem et al. 2001); this would 
imply less loss aversion asymmetry, i.e. larger 𝜇, for large and low-income households.  
 The first condition COND1𝑖,𝑡 is that the household’s brand choices correspond to 
expensive brands. Consistent with earlier conceptualization, we capture the extent to 
which this is met for household i at purchase occasion t by computing the average price 
ranking of the household’s previously chosen brands:  
 
(10)                   COND1𝑖,𝑡 = 1𝐽(𝑡 − 1)��𝐼(PRICE𝑖,𝑗,𝜏 < PRICE𝑖,𝑦𝑖,𝜏,𝜏)𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑡−1
𝜏=1
 , 
 
where PRICE𝑖,𝑗,𝜏 is the price of brand j observed by household i at purchase occasion 𝜏, PRICE𝑖,𝑦𝑖,𝜏,𝜏 is the price of the chosen brand at that occasion and 𝐼(PRICE𝑖,𝑗,𝜏 <PRICE𝑖,𝑦𝑖,𝜏,𝜏) is a 0/1 dummy variable indicating whether PRICE𝑖,𝑗,𝜏 < PRICE𝑖,𝑦𝑖,𝜏,𝜏. We 
represent the second condition COND2𝑖,𝑡 that the household experiences upward prices 
by the average price change for all brands and all purchase occasions at which the 
household could observe brand prices: 
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(11)                   COND2𝑖,𝑡 = 1𝐽(𝑡 − 1)��(PRICE𝑖,𝑗,𝜏 − PRICE𝑖,𝑗,𝜏−1𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑡
𝜏=2
) . 
 
The variables in (10) and (11) are indeed strongly connected to the gain frequency 
differential between ERP and IRP; linear regression with the gain frequency differential 
for household i at occasion t acting as the dependent variable and COND1𝑖,𝑡 and COND2𝑖,𝑡 being the independent variables results in highly significant coefficients (p < 
.0001) in both product categories (𝑅ketchup2 = .64; 𝑅peanut butter2 = .57). 
 
< TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 Table 3 contains the parameter estimates of the full model. All segment-specific 
response coefficients in the first part of the table have the expected sign and most of them 
are significant at the 1% level. For ketchup, the first two segments are almost equally 
large (41% and 37%) and both of them are sensitive to reference prices, while the third 
segment is smaller (22%) and not driven by reference prices (Moon et al. 2006). 
Regarding feature and display, the second segment is most responsive and the third 
segment is least responsive. For peanut butter, the first two segments together capture 
75% of the market. Households are responsive to marketing mix in both segments, but 
segment 2 is more responsive than segment 1. Furthermore, households in segment 2 
dislike the store brand; they use price and promotion to choose between national brands. 
The second part of Table 3 provides the loss aversion estimates. Most 
importantly, the coefficients 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 of the two pricing conditions are negative and 
significant at the 1% level in both product categories; this confirms our hypotheses that 
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the first condition leads to more asymmetry by increasing loss aversion in ERP and the 
second condition does so by decreasing loss aversion in IRP. 8 The effects of the four 
alternative explanations are weaker: three of them (interpurchase time, household size 
and income) are as anticipated in both product categories, but only two of the six 
coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
 
Impact of loss aversion asymmetry on the effectiveness of price promotions 
 To explore the implications of loss aversion asymmetry, we run a simulation in 
which we use the brand prices and response parameters from the base model in the 
peanut butter category, but vary the values of 𝜆 and 𝜇 in four different scenarios. We 
consider a one-time price cut by one of the brands that equals 10 percent of the category 
price, while keeping the prices of all other brands fixed (Moon et al. 2006; Rajendran and 
Tellis 1994); this is consistent with the empirical finding that the most common 
competitive response is no response (Steenkamp et al. 2005). For each scenario, Table 4 
provides (a) the percentage-point increase in the focal brand’s choice probability at the 
current purchase occasion with the one-time price promotion and (b) the net cumulative 
change across both current and future occasions, expressed in the same unit. 
 
< TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 Compared to scenario 1 (𝜆 = 1 and 𝜇 = 1), scenario 2 keeps loss aversion for IRP 
constant at 𝜆𝜇 = 1 but induces loss aversion asymmetry (𝜇 = 0.5) by increasing loss 
aversion for ERP (𝜆 = 2): the adverse impact of losses with regard to ERP becomes 
                                                   
8 The two pricing conditions are strongly connected to the gain frequency differential between ERP and 
IRP. Replacing them in the full model, the coefficient of the gain frequency differential has the expected 
sign in both categories; it is significant at 5% for ketchup and significant at 1% for peanut putter. 
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larger in scenario 2, making it more rewarding to use a price discount to decrease ERP 
losses than to increase corresponding gains. As a price cut mainly reduces ERP losses for 
expensive brands, while it tends to increase gains for cheap brands, expensive brands 
benefit most. This is reflected in both the instantaneous (current) and cumulative (current 
plus future) effects of the simulated price promotion in scenario 2. 
 Comparing scenario 2 and scenario 3, loss aversion for ERP is kept constant at 
𝜆 = 2, but asymmetry is brought into scenario 2 by decreasing loss aversion in IRP. 
Table 4 shows that the instantaneous effect of the price promotion on brand choice 
probability is identical in the two scenarios, due to the same ERP coefficients. However, 
the cumulative net effect is positive in scenario 2 but negative in scenario 3, meaning that 
without loss aversion asymmetry (scenario 3) the promotion’s negative future carry-over 
outweighs the immediate positive impact. Intuitively, a price reduction triggers future 
IRP losses in both scenarios, but these losses are penalized much more in the symmetric 
scenario 3 than in the asymmetric scenario 2. In this case, the mechanism is so strong that 
loss aversion asymmetry makes the difference between an effective and an ineffective 
price promotion in terms of cumulative net effect.  
Scenarios 2 and 4 share the same asymmetry coefficient 𝜇 = 0.5. The simulation 
results demonstrate that differences in promotional effectiveness between expensive and 
cheap brands −due to a fixed loss aversion asymmetry− become more pronounced if the 
amount of loss aversion 𝜆 increases. Moreover, the effectiveness gap can become so large 
that price promotions are effective for expensive brands but ineffective for cheaper 
brands. Overall, we conclude from the simulation that asymmetric loss aversion makes it 
more attractive to promote frequently, but more so for higher-price brands. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 Loss aversion has been much debated in the reference price literature. A possible 
reason for the mixed support is that the presence of loss aversion depends on the type of 
reference price: ERP or IRP. Mazumdar and Papatla (2000) found empirical evidence 
that ERP-oriented customer segments are more sensitive to losses, while IRP segments 
are more sensitive to gains. More broadly, this suggests that consumers are less loss 
averse in IRP than ERP, which is intriguing but puzzling: other studies remained silent on 
asymmetric loss aversion and neither explanation nor implications have been provided so 
far. In the current study, we attempted to fill this gap. First, we considered several loss 
aversion estimates from the literature to establish that asymmetric loss aversion is 
commonplace. Next, we postulated that the lower degree of loss aversion in IRP as 
compared to ERP is driven by two empirical regularities triggering ERP gains and IRP 
losses, and that the larger number of IRP losses makes households less loss averse in that 
type. We found empirical support in two product categories, while four alternative 
explanations of loss aversion asymmetry did not have much explanatory power. 
 By proposing the asymmetric loss aversion finding of Mazumdar and Papatla 
(2000) –which was only a relatively small part of their paper– as an empirical 
generalization, we hope this result will become more influential and salient. Rajendran 
and Tellis (1994) conclude that only the inclusion of both ERP and IRP can justify a 
pricing scheme with both high regular prices and low discount prices, but do not consider 
loss aversion. The literature also reports that loss aversion in IRP makes it more 
profitable to smooth out price fluctuations, while gain seeking increases the net payoff of 
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price promotions (Greenleaf 1995; Kalwani and Yim 1992; Kopalle et al. 1996).9 
However, none of the abovementioned studies have incorporated loss aversion in both 
ERP and IRP, which is needed to understand the implications of loss aversion asymmetry 
for long-run (cumulative) promotional impact. Our simulation shows that the presence of 
asymmetry makes it more effective to have price promotions frequently, in particular for 
expensive brands. It provides a rationale for the existence of both Every-Day-Low-Price 
brands that are not on discount and Hi-Lo premium brands that are promoted relatively 
often: expensive brands can use temporary price cuts to transform ERP losses into ERP 
gains without heavy penalization of induced future IRP losses, while cheaper brands 
already tend to correspond to ERP gains and therefore have less need (and margins) to 
promote often. Furthermore, the frequency-importance connection for losses suggests 
that brands can be promoted more often in times of price inflation when consumers are 
desensitized toward IRP losses following price promotions. 
 This study suggests several avenues for further research. First, we have used data 
from two product categories and implemented within-category individual-level tests. An 
important extension is to assess what percentage of variation in loss aversion estimates 
across categories is explained by the two pricing conditions and other characteristics at 
the category level. In a similar vein as a meta analysis, this may help to clarify why loss 
aversion is found in some extant studies but not in others. Second, our empirical 
modeling approach is reduced-form; one could attempt to build a more structural model 
or do an analytical study (Putler 1992). Third, the model of brand choice may be 
extended with a latitude of price acceptance within which the consumer does not respond 
                                                   
9 Kopalle et al. (1996) also derive implications of loss aversion in ERP for optimal pricing policies, but 
their model does not consider ERP and IRP simultaneously. 
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to deviations from the reference price (Gupta and Cooper 1992; Kalyanaram and Little 
1994) and the thresholds for gains and losses may be asymmetric (Han et al. 2001). 
While extant studies with loss aversion in both ERP and IRP do not incorporate a latitude 
of price acceptance, it would drive the frequencies of gains and losses. Similarly, 
consideration set formation may influence the percentages of gains versus losses, for 
example, if brands that are on promotion are more likely to enter the consumer’s 
consideration set (Andrews and Srinivasan 1995; Bronnenberg and Vanhonacker 1996). 
Finally, reference prices are not observed in scanner panel data and need to be 
inferred from observed shelf prices, which may deviate from consumers’ perceived 
prices. For instance, consumers tend to underestimate the prices they paid (Dickson and 
Sawyer 1990; Vanhuele and Dreze 2002), increasing the perceived number of IRP losses. 
To resolve the price perception (and possibly other) issues, one may complement our 
scanner data analysis with controlled experiments (Kalwani and Yim 1992). Reference 
price studies based on scanner data versus experiments constitute “two fairly independent 
streams of research” (Mazumdar et al. 2005, p. 84), but have the potential to strengthen 
each other in order to better understand actual purchase behavior and its underlying 
psychology. 
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Table 1 
Overview of estimates of loss aversion asymmetry, computed from the literature. 
 
Study Level of 
analysis 
Unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Product categories ERP (𝜆) IRP (𝜆𝜇) Ratio (𝜇) 
Bell and Lattin (2000) Individual Latent class Orange juice and 
11 other categories 
Loss aversion in ERP for 7 out of 
12 categories, no loss aversion in 
IRP for all 12 categories 
Briesch et al. (1997) Individual Latent class Both ERP and IRP 
are reported for 
liquid detergent 
0.44 0.20 0.47 
Hardie et al. (1993) Individual No Orange juice 1.66 1.46 0.88 
Mazumdar and Papatla 
(1995) 
Individual Deterministic 
segmentation 
Margarine and 
liquid detergent 
𝜆𝜇 virtually zero for margarine 
(𝜇 ≈ 0), while 𝜆𝜇 very large for 
liquid detergent (𝜇 very large) 
Moon et al. (2006) Individual Latent class 
structural 
heterogeneity 
Toilet tissue 18.04 4.88 0.27 
Pauwels et al. (2007) Aggregate Not applicable Combination of 
brands from 20 
categories 
0.91 0.59 0.65 
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Table 2 
Frequencies of gains and losses for ERP and IRP. 
  
  ERP IRP differential p-value 
ketchup % gain 68 50 18 0.000 
 % loss 32 50   
peanut butter % gain 54 30 24 0.000 
 % loss 46 70   
      
across-category differential 14 20   
p-value  0.000 0.000   
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Table 3 
Parameter estimates of the full model (standard errors in parentheses). All brand 
constants are relative to the Store brand. For the two pricing conditions and the 
alternative-explanation variables, negative coefficients indicate more asymmetry. 
 ketchup  peanut butter 
segment number 1 2 3  1  2 3 4 
segment size 41% 37% 22%  46% 29% 19% 6% 
        
HEINZ / JIF 1.249a 2.985a 2.794a  0.725a 3.370a 1.746a 4.931a 
 (0.159) (0.258) (0.336)  (0.111) (0.251) (0.311) (0.748) 
HUNTS / PETER PAN −0.181b 1.575a 2.152a  0.174c 3.009a 0.933a  0.237 
 (0.091) (0.250) (0.309)  (0.094) (0.219) (0.258) (1.071) 
DEL MONTE / SKIPPY −0.377a 0.932a 0.767b  0.610a 3.309a 1.470a 4.359a 
 (0.087) (0.244) (0.379)  (0.083) (0.220) (0.230) (0.695) 
BLOY 0.238a 0.119a 0.188a  0.313a 0.145a 0.292a 0.156a 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.015)  (0.006) (0.014) (0.023) (0.024) 
FEATURE 0.164a 0.282a 0.088a  0.109a 0.298a 0.524a 0.446a 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.032)  (0.021) (0.034) (0.074) (0.107) 
DISPLAY 0.163a 0.437a 0.138a  0.162a 0.528a 0.515a 0.122 
 (0.034) (0.067) (0.037)  (0.049) (0.110) (0.168) (0.207) 
ERPGAIN 0.115a 0.121a 0.015  0.022a 0.063a 0.081a  0.026b 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)  (0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
IRPGAIN 0.087a 0.124a 0.024  0.036a  0.054a 0.080a  0.033 
 (0.019) (0.030) (0.034)  (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.030) 
LOSS AVERSION (𝜆)             1.066       (0.078)                1.631a      (0.154) 
ASYMMETRY (𝜇)           0.356a      (0.238)                0.459a      (0.113) 
CONDITION 1 (𝛿1)         −1.006a      (0.088)              −1.978a      (0.145) 
CONDITION 2 (𝛿2)         −3.203a      (0.854)              −0.895a      (0.243) 
LOYALTY         −4.299c      (2.212)                1.059       (0.757) 
INTERPURCH TIME           0.052       (0.062)                0.121b      (0.050) 
HHOLD SIZE           0.283b      (0.134)                0.081       (0.093) 
HHOLD INCOME         −0.258       (0.210)              −0.021       (0.047) 
𝜅BLOY                    0.790
a      (0.010)                0.807a      (0.005) 
𝜅IRP           0.643
a      (0.012)                0.295a      (0.068) 
Log-likelihood   −8035.86      −12919.49 
a significant at 1%, b significant at 5%, c significant at 10% (significance of 𝜆 and 𝜇 relative to 1). 
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Table 4 
Instantaneous and cumulative effects of price promotions.  
 
 scenario 1  scenario 2  scenario 3  scenario 4 
        
loss aversion 𝜆 = 1  𝜆 = 2  𝜆 = 2  𝜆 = 3 
asymmetry 𝜇 = 1  𝜇 = 0.5  𝜇 = 1  𝜇 = 0.5 
            
            
brand (price) instant cumul  instant cumul  instant cumul  instant cumul 
     1  (9.85c) 12.18 9.25  13.98 14.85  13.98 −6.68  15.63 9.76 
     2  (9.34c) 12.18 9.25  13.45 13.61  13.45 −7.71  14.53 6.62 
     3  (9.31c) 12.18 9.25  13.39 13.45  13.39 −7.83  14.43 6.44 
     4  (8.00c) 12.18 9.25  11.24 10.13  11.24 −11.12  10.01 −0.27 
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Figure 1  
Illustration of the two pricing conditions triggering ERP gains and IRP losses. 
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